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THE ALL VOLUNTEER FORCE,
CONSCRIPTION, AND OTHER ALTERNATIVES
INTRODUCTION
The United States has relied on volunteers to man its armed services for
most of its history. In recent decades, however, a draft has been utilized to
provide personnel for the armed services. On January 27, 1973, the United
States reverted to its tradition of volunteer service when Secretary of Defense
Melvin R. Laird announced the abolition of the draft. This decision followed
the recommendation of the Gates Commission which had been established by
President Nixon to determine whether the United States should end conscrip-
tion. 1 The return to an all volunteer force (AVF) ended over three decades
of conscription.
The draft has frequently been a controversial and hotly debated subject
from the days of World War II to Vietnam. Our modern AVF has proven
to be just as controversial from its inception. Its critics charge that its personnel
are of a subpar quality, that discipline is lax and that it is ill equipped to
defend the interests of the nation in the event of another war. But the AVF
also has its defenders who believe that not only is it capable of doing an
adequate job of protecting us in wartime, it is also, perhaps, the best peacetime
army this country has ever had.
The purpose of this note is to evaluate the AVF, to discuss the possibility
of a return to the draft and to review other alternatives to the present AVF.
AN ASSESSMENT OF THE AVF
Educational and Mental Levels
Most defenders of the AVF also admit that the present method of recruitment
has its share of difficulties. 2 The principal problem of the AVF is its inability
to attract enough quality people to join the enlisted ranks. The educational
levels of male enlistees today are significantly lower that that of the civilian
population or the army enlistees of 1964, the year of the last peacetime
draft. 3 All of the services have had difficulty attracting high school graduates
to their ranks, with the Army having the most difficulty. In 1977, for example,
only fifty-six percent of Army enlistees were high school graduates.4 The
percentage of high school graduates is an important statistic since high school
1. The Report of the President's Commission on an All-Volunteer Force (1970).
2. See, e.g. Report by W. King, Senate Comm. on Armed Services, 95th Cong., 1st. Sess., Achieving
America's Goal: The All-Volunteer Force or National Service (Comm. Print 1977) and C. Moskos,
"The Enlisted Ranks in the All-volunteer Army," in The All-Volunteer Force and American
Society 39-80 (John B. Keeley ed, 1978).
3. Moskos supra note 2, at 41.
4. Department of Defense Authorization for Appropriations For Fiscal Year 1979: Hearings on H.R.
10929 Before House Comm. on Armed Services, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 161 (1978) (written statement
of John P. White, Assistant Secretary of Defense for Manpower, Reserve Affairs, and Logistics).
[hereinafter cited as 1978 House Hearings]. One expert has predicted that by 1985 the services would
be fortunate to attract a proportion of 43 percent high school graduates. See: The All-Volunteer
Armed Force: .Hearings Before the Senate Comm. on Armed Services, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 19 (1977)
(statement of Martin Binkin, senior fellow, The Brookings Institution).
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graduates seem to perform better in their jobs and have a lower attrition rate
than non-graduates. Specifically, high school graduates are almost twice as
likely to complete their enlistments as those who have not completed high
school. 5
Mental levels of male enlistees have also declined under the AVF.6 The
percentage of enlistees in the top fifty percentile in mental level in the general
population had, by 1977, dropped to its lowest level in the history of the AVF.
Meanwhile, the percentage of enlistees in the lower fifty percentile had risen
from 32.5 percent in 1974 to 49.6 percent in 1977. 7 As a result of the low
mental levels, Army officers frequently complain of enlisted men forgetting
the skills they have been taught.8 While mental levels have declined, military
weaponry has become much more sophisticated in recent years with the result
that units in the field often have soldiers who are incapable of operating
weapons which were assigned to them.
Attrition Rate and Discipline in the AVF
Another problem facing the AVF is the shockingly high attrition rate
among its first term enlistees. By 1978, almost forty percent of all first term
enlistees in all services failed to complete their first term of enlistment.9 This
high rate of attrition has served to increase the costs of the AVF since it
must spend substantial amounts of money to recruit, train, feed, clothe and
house individuals who give little or nothing in return.
The AVF is also troubled with discipline problems. The percentage of
enlisted men leaving the service with an honorable discharge has declined
during the time of the AVF to the point where, in 1976, only eighty-six
percent of all discharges were honorable.' 0 In the Marine Corps, from 1973
to 1975, Absent Without Official Leave (AWOL) rates increased by twenty-eight
percent and desertion rates increased by sixty-six percent. Although these rates
have declined since, the price for this has been an increase in the first term
attrition rate. 11 In the Navy, absentee rates more than tripled and desertion
rates almost doubled between 1973 and 1976 to reach record high levels -
higher than any previously recorded, including the Vietnam and Korean
periods. 12
AVF Recruiting Problems in the Future
In addition to having difficulty recruiting a high caliber of enlisted
individuals, the AVF has also had a problem attracting sufficient numbers of
5. Moskos supra note 2, at 70.
6. All recruits are classified into mental aptitude levels according to their score on entrance tests, formerly
known as the Armed Forces Qualification Test (AFQT) and more recently as the Armed Service
Vocational Aptitude Battery (ASVAB).
7. Report by R. Beard, Subcomm. on Manpower and Personnel of the Senate Comm. on Armed Services,
An Analysis and Evaluation of the United States Army 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 152 (Comm. Print
1978) [hereinafter cited as The Beard Report].
8. Status of the All- Volunteer Armed Forge: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Manpower and Personnel
of the Senate Comm. on Armed Services, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 14 (1978) (statement of Col. William
C. Chamberlain, Inspector General, 8th Army, Korea) [hereinafter cited as 1978 Senate Heearings:
Status].
9. Costs of the All- Volunteer Armed Force: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Manpower and Personnel
of the Senate Comm. on Armed Services, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 53 (1978) (written statement of
Senator Sam Nunn) [hereinafter cited as 1978 Senate Hearings: Costs].
10. Id. at 53.
11. Id. at 53.
12. Id. at 53.
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recruits to fill its ranks. The active services have managed to remain within
one and one half percent of congressionally authorized strengths in every year
since the beginning of the AVF. However, this has been possible only because
Congress has steadily decreased its personnel authorizations for the armed
services. 13 Congress has taken this action because of its recognition of the
AVF's recruiting difficulties. Congress also feared that if it did not decrease
the personnel strengths of the armed services, they would lower their standards
for enlistment even further. 14
While the AVF has enough difficulty recruiting sufficient personnel to
presently man its services, recruitment difficulties will, in all likelihood, increase
in the near future. This will come as a result of changes in long term trends
which previously have benefitted the AVF. The AVF has been able to recruit
as well as it has up to this point because of three factors. First, during the
first six years of the AVF, there has been an unusually high number of males
from seventeen to twenty-one years old, the age bracket from which the AVF
solicits the vast majority of its first term enlistees. In the future, however, as
the number of men in this age group steadily decreases, 15 recruiting new
enlistees will be more difficult.
The military has also benefitted from high unemployment rates among
youth, particularly in the case of minorities. 16 Although economic forecasts are
not always reliable, the Congressional Budget Office has forecast a decline in
the unemployment rate from 7.9 percent in September, 1976 to 4.2 percent
in 1982, with corresponding declines in the rate for eighteen to nineteen year
old males from nineteen to ten percent. 17 Studies have shown that there is a
direct correlation between an increase in unemployment and an increase in
enlistments. 18 When employment rates drop, therefore, an even greater squeeze
will be placed on recruiters to meet their quotas.
AVF recruiters have also profited from large salary increases for enlisted
men in the last ten years. One study has estimated that the real increase in
pay for military recruits, that is, total pay increases minus pay increases to
keep up with inflation, has been about 193 percent from 1964 to 1973.19 It
is unlikely that pay increases will be able to go forward at the same pace in
the future. Military leaders and government officials have become concerned
about personnel costs consuming an ever increasing percentage of the defense
budget.20 Therefore, it is unlikely that the armed services will be able to attract
a greater number of recruits in the future by drastically increasing salaries.
As recruiting becomes more difficult, recruiters are frequently resorting to
illegal methods of recruitment. On November 19, 1979, the Army discharged
13. 1978 Senate Hearings. Status, supra note 8, at 50 (statement of John P. White, Assistant Secretary
of Defense for Manpower, Reserve Affairs, and Logistics).
14. Id. at 50.
15. There were 1.8 million males in this group in 1977. This will decrease to 1.6 million in 1985 and
1.4 million in 1994. See: 1978 House Hearings, supra note 4, at 162 (written statement of John P.
White, Assistant Secretary of Defense for Manpower, Reserve Affairs, and Logistics).
16. The Beard Report supra note 7, at 159.
17. Congressional Budget Office, Defense Manpower: Compensation Issues for Fiscal Year 1977, (Background
Paper No. 6, Apr. 2, 1976).
18. Cortright, Economic Conscription, Society, May-June 1975, at 45.
19. Demirles, Adjusted Consumer Price Index for Military Personnel and a Comparison of Real Civilian
and Military Earnings, 1964-1973 (George Washington University Technical Memorandum TM-1200,
Office of Naval Research Project NR 347-024, Nov. 1, 1974) at 9.
20. King supra note 2, at 12.
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427 recruiters from their positions because of recruiting violations.21 About
seventy-five percent of the cases involved false information about education
records of potential recruits who had not graduated from high school. Other
cases involved illegal coaching for enlistment tests and concealment of police
records, medical problems, and other information. There is also evidence that
recruiters frequently mislead potential recruits and promise them things they
will never receive in order to get them to enlist.22
Costs of the AVF
One factor which may lead to the eventual demise of the AVF is its high
cost. If costs continue to rise as they have been, the AVF may reach a point
where it is simply cost prohibitive. A report issued by the General Accounting
Office has estimated that the AVF has contributed to a three billion dollar
annual increase in the defense budget since 1973.23 Most of the increased costs
are due to pay increases which have come into effect since the advent of the
AVF. The actual cost is more easily understood when one realizes that personnel
costs represented forty-three percent of the defense budget in 1964 and
constituted fifty-four percent of the budget in fiscal year 1976.24 As a result
of this increase, the Defense Department has shifted resources away from
weapon procurement and research and development to pay for personnel.
Status of U.S. Reserve Forces
United States defense strategy presently employs what is known as the
total force concept which combines active duty AVF with the reserves. Under
this plan, heavy reliance is placed upon the reserve forces in the event of
another major war. Army reserves now constitute fifty-four percent of the
total force in the event of war.25
The problems of the active component of the AVF pale in comparison
with those of the Reserves. Recruiting has been extremely difficult for the
Reserves since they no longer have the draft as a motivation for enlistment.
Also absent is the large flow of individuals from the active component with
long residual obligations of Reserve service. As a result, Selected Reserve units
have had a great deal of difficulty keeping their strength up to authorized
levels. By the end of 1978, there was a shortage of 53,000 in reserve personnel
with the bulk of the shortage falling within the Army Reserve and Army
National Guard. 26
In addition to the organized reserve units or Selected Reserve, the AVF
relies on the Individual Ready Reserve (IRR) to meet its wartime requirements.
21. Chicago Tribune, Nov. 20, 1979, at 3, col. 1.
22. A substantial number of first term recruits feel that they have been misled by recruiters who promised
them things they have never received. See: 1978 Senate Hearings: Status, supra note 8, at 8.
(statement of Robin Beard, U.S. Representative from Tenn.) and The Beard Report, supra note 7,
at 209-210.
23. General Accounting Office, Additional Cost of The All-Volunteer Force, Report FPCD-78-11 (1978).
24. King supra note 2, at 12. Congressional Budget Office estimates for defense manpower costs under
current defense policy, i.e., costs reflecting inflation and increased retirement costs but not policy
changes show manpower costs rising from 55.8 billion in 1977 to 75.9 billion in 1981, a 36 percent
increase. See: Defense Manpower: Compensation Issues for Fiscal 1977, Background Paper No. 6,
Congressional Budget Office, April 2, 1976, Table 11, p. 37.
25. The Beard Report supra note 7, at 188.
26. The overall shortfall is predicted to more than double from the current 53,500 by the end of fiscal
year 1978. See King supra note 2, at 23.
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The IRR is composed of servicemen who have completed a tour of active duty
and remain in the reserves although they are not attached to a specific Selected
Reserve unit. The IRR is programmed to bring certain active and reserve
units to their authorized wartime strength and to replace combat losses sustained
by organized units in the early stages of war. From a level of 920,000 enlisted
personnel in 1971, the IRR has dwindled to a level of approximately 140,000
and may go as low as 120,000.27 Depending on who is making the estimates,
the Office of the Secretary of Defense or the Army, the Army alone is from
200,000 to 500,000 men short of its needed strength.28 In the event of another
major war, organized reserve units would have to be broken up to provide
replacements for casualties in active units unless something is done about the
IRR shortage. If this happens, the wartime strength of the United States will
be seriously crippled.
CONSCRIPTION: A PUBLIC POLICY CHOICE
BETWEEN LIBERTY AND EQUALITY
It seems certain that an attempt to reinstate some type of conscription
will be met with substantial opposition. American memories of the Vietnam
era and its draft are too vivid. Indeed, the anti-militarism which the Vietnam
experience engendered in American society was probably one of the major
causes behind the decision to go to an AVF.
Debates over a return to conscription have produced some unusual political
configurations. Ordinarily, one would expect liberals to be opposed to a return
to the draft and conservatives to be in favor of such a move. The traditional
labels, however, can no longer be used to predict opinions on this subject.
Such staunch pro-military conservatives as John Stennis of Mississippi and
Sam Nunn of Georgia have found themselves allied with liberal Senator Edward
Kennedy of Massachusetts when they advocate a return to the draft. At the
same time, the noted conservative and ally of the military, Senator Barry
Goldwater of Arizona, is an uncompromising foe of a return to the draft.29
Much of the difference in opinion can be better explained as one between
libertarians and levelers. Democratic societies have traditionally espoused the
twin doctrines of liberty and equality as being two of the most fundamental
values of their culture. What is often forgotten, however, is that these two
values are often competing ones, with one being promoted at the expense of
the other. 30 To increase the equality among citizens in a society often necessitates
an increase in governmental power and a lessening of individual freedom. By
the same token, when a government adopts a stance of strict non-interference
in the lives of its citizens, it will not be able to remedy inequalities in its
society.
27. Department of Defense Authorization Act, Fiscal Year 1980: Hearing Before the House Comm. on
Armed Services, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. 125 (1979) (report by William D. Price, professional staff
member, House Comm. on Armed Services) [hereinafter cited as 1979 House Hearings].
28. Id. at 126.
29. Kennedy may have changed his views somewhat since his statements before the Senate Comm. on
Armed Services. His objection to an AVF at that time was that it would be inequitable. Goldwater
has not changed his views since the Hearings. See: Selective Service and Military Compensation:
Hearing Before the Senate Comm. on Armed Services 92nd Cong., 1st Sess. 108 and 284 (1971)
(statements by Senator Edward Kennedy and Senator Barry Goldwater).
30. See The discussion in Alexis De Tocqueville, Democracy in America at 503-506 (1848).
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Since a disproportionate number of men in the enlisted ranks of the AVF
are from lower income groups and minorities, 31 a return to a non-discriminating
draft would help to distribute the burden of national defense more equitably
among all social classes. 32 While a return to conscription would promote the
value of equality, it would, however, also infringe upon the personal liberty
of those citizens who do not wish to serve in the military. Attitudes toward
a draft can often be explained by examining which value an individual places
above the other. Kennedy favors a return to the draft because he is a leveler;
Goldwater opposes it because he is a libertarian.
A good argument can be made for a return to a non-discriminatory draft
on the grounds that it is more equitable than the present AVF system. The
return to the AVF has served only to perpetuate the inequalities of the Vietnam
era draft.33 If it was wrong for the Vietnam draft to draw disproportionately
from among the poor and minorities, it is wrong for the AVF to do the
same. 34 Unless Congress enacts a non-discriminatory draft statute, the next
war will be a poor man's war just as Vietnam was. 35
PROPOSED CONSCRIPTION PLANS
Universal Military Training
If the choice is based solely on considerations of equity, justice and fair
play, a logical plan is universal military training. That is, all males (and
perhaps females) 36 would be obligated to perform a minimum amount of
military service. The length of service required would probably be from one
to two years of active duty or a shorter period of active duty coupled with a
reserve obligation. An individual's military obligation would be divided between
active and reserve duty according to the needs of the military and the desires
of the individual.
Universal military training would appear to be the best type of draft plan.
Besides its appeal to equitable principles, it has other advantages. It would
provide a pool of trained manpower available for an emergency since large
numbers of civilians would have some military training. The depleted strengths
of reserve units could also be augmented. In addition, the active forces could
be decreased and greater reliance could be placed on a quickly mobilized
reserve.
31. King supra note 2, at 16.
32. One must keep in mind that a reinstatement of the draft will not accomplish the task of achieving
a more equitable proportionment of the burden of national defense if a draft similar to that of the
Vietnam era is enacted. Any new draft statute must not, for example, grant deferrments to college
students while conscripting those who do not choose to go to college or cannot afford to do so.
33. The old draft statute, Pub. L. 90-40, § 1(6), 81 Stat. 103 (June 30, 1967), deferred the drafting of
college students until their graduation. This was the law until 1971 when it was repealed and replaced
by 50 U.S.C. Appx. § 456(i)(2) (1976) which merely postponed, rather than deferred, the induction
of college students until the end of the semester or academic year. Thus, from 1971 on, more college
students were drafted.
34. 1978 Senate Hearings: Status, supra note 8, at 30 (statement of Senator Dewey Bartlett).
35. Badillo and Curry, The Social Incidence of Vietnam Casualties: Social Class or Race, 2 Armed
Forces and Society, 397-406 (1976).
36. The question of whether women should be drafted is a worthy one and should be considered in a
note by itself. Therefore, it is beyond the scope of this note and will not be considered here.
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Although this concept is attractive in many respects, it has little chance
of being put into practice simply because it is too impractical. The military's
training facilities would not be able to accommodate the number of individuals
who would be involved in such a plan.3 7 Large amounts of military resources,
including its personnel, would have to be diverted to train this large number
of recruits with the result being the decreased effectiveness of military
forces.3 8 The cost of such an undertaking would probably be enormous. One
estimate has predicted that if all recruits were to serve one year of active
duty the gross cost would be thirty-five billion dollars. 39
A Draft Lottery Plan
Perhaps the best alternative to universal military training is a draft lottery.
In such a system all eligible individuals would be placed in a common pool
and draftees would be chosen randomly from that pool. Deferments would be
given, ideally, only to the physically and mentally handicapped and the clergy.
Large segments of draft age men, such as college students, would not be
granted deferments as was the case with the Vietnam era lottery draft.40 Such
a system would not be as equitable as universal training since some would be
chosen while others would not; it would, however, be cost effective.
The armed services under a lottery draft would be similar to those of the
pre-AVF era, i.e., a mixture of volunteers and conscripts. There would be a
draft to make up the difference between authorized personnel levels and the
number of volunteers. Since the AVF is presently meeting its personnel needs
for the most part, at least in terms of numbers, it would appear that only a
small number of draftees would be required. The military could, however,
increase its qualifications requirements for personnel with conscription available
as a means of acquiring personnel. For example, the military might require
that all volunteers be high school graduates. The armed services could alter
their qualifications requirements depending upon the percentage of volunteers
and conscripts they desired.
The foremost advantage of a lottery draft is that it would provide a better
caliber of recruit for the armed services. The services would get the type of
recruit the AVF is not attracting: the middle and upper class college-bound
individual.41 An increase of these individuals in the ranks of the armed services
would provide the manpower needed to operate the increasingly sophisticated
weaponry now used by the services. In addition, discipline and attrition problems
would be curbed. 42
37. If the military only began taking all men who turned eighteen every year they would have to recruit
and train 1.8 million in 1980. See: 1978 House Hearings, supra note 4, at 162 (statement of John
P. White, Assistant Secretary of Defense for Manpower, Reserve Affairs, and Logistics).
38. King supra note 2, at 56.
39. Id. at 56.
40. Supra note 33.
41. There is an extremely conspicuous absence of middle class individuals in the armed services. See:
Continuing Review of the All-Volunteer Force: Hearing Before the Military Personnel Subcomm. of
the House Comm. on Armed Services, 95th Cong., 2nd Sess. 3 (1978) (statement of Dr. Charles C.
Moskos, Professor of Sociology, Northwestern University) [hereinafter cited as 1978 House Hearings:
Review 1.
42. High school graduates are twice as likely to complete their initial term of enlistment as non-graduates.
An influx of college individuals should, therefore, decrease attrition. See Moskos supra note 2, at 70.
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ADVANTAGES AND DISADVANTAGES
OF CONSCRIPTION
The armed forces may be perceived as being akin to social welfare centers
or job training organizations devoted to teaching useful skills to our youth.
Indeed, the military has cultivated this image for itself in its recruitment
drives. Therefore, the question arises as to whether a draft would cut off the
armed services as a source of social betterment of many disadvantaged youth.
In reality, the armed services play a very limited role in training soldiers
in skills transferable to the civilian sector. Some skills, such as combat arms,
obviously do not have civilian counterparts, while other skills, which are
technical in nature, also have no value for civilian employment. For example,
an electronics technician specializing in missile guidance is not qualified to
repair television sets.43 Other skills are transferable to civilian life. The civilian
sector, however, often does not employ as many individuals in that specialty
as do the services. For example, in 1960, 10.6 percent of all enlisted people
worked in aircraft mechanics, compared to only 0.3 percent of the civilian
labor force. In absolute terms, 194,000 enlisted people worked as aircraft
mechanics, compared to only 117,000 persons so employed in the entire civilian
economy. 44
Despite their limited utility for training youth in employment skills, the
armed services continue to portray themselves as vocational training schools
rather than as organizations geared to fighting wars. To do so, while few
recruits ever learn skills which will benefit them in civilian life, is fraudulent
and deceptive. A return to the draft would help to eliminate the necessity of
using misleading recruitment advertisements to attract enlistees.
The armed services do, to a very limited extent, serve as vehicles for social
betterment for disadvantaged youth. This could be preserved under a return
to the draft provided certain policy steps were taken. The principal step would
be to place draftees in the combat arms branches of the various services since
these skills are not transferable to civilian life. Volunteers could be placed in
positions where they could acquire useful skills which could be transferred to
civilian life. Underprivileged youth would for the most part, however, do better
with civilian vocational schools such as the Job Corps if they desire to learn
useful skills.
Under the present AVF system, recruiter promises of acquiring useful skills
which are not fulfilled help cause post entry disillusionment among recruits.
Draftees would not suffer from the disillusionment of many volunteers because
they have not been made extravagant promises and thus have lower expectations
than do volunteers as to what military life will be like.45 As disillusionment
goes down so will the attrition rate.
43. Cortwright supra note 18, at 45.
44. Id. at 45-46.
45. Moskos supra note 2, at 62.
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A return to the draft would also result in cost savings for the tax-
payers. 46 The services would not have to pay attractive salaries and large
bonuses to draftees as they presently do to volunteers.
One objection to such a conscription plan is that it would increase the
militarism in our society and make government leaders more prone to engage
in foreign conflicts. 47 This objection does not hold up under close analysis. In
fact, a return to conscription would discourage military adventurism.
The greatest inhibition on the decision of a democratically elected leader
to wage war is the inability to obtain the people's support.48 Common sense
dictates that voters will be less likely to support foreign military adventures
if their sons, husbands, and relatives are in the armed services. Under the
AVF, the enlisted ranks are composed, for the most part, of individuals from
lower income groups and minority groups.49 Thus, the middle and upper classes
are underrepresented in the armed services. 50
The middle and upper classes would be less vocal in opposing foreign
military involvements if their relatives are not doing the fighting. They would
simply not have as great a stake in the outcome of a governmental decision
to go to war.51 This encourages military adventurism since it is these groups
which carry the greatest political weight in the United States; they are more
active political participants than people in the lower classes. It is a well
accepted generalization in the literature of political science that people of
higher social and economic status participate more in politics than people of
lower social and economic status. 52 This generalization holds true whether one
uses level of education, income or occupation as the measure of social
status. 53 They interact more frequently with those who are politically active
and thus receive greater political stimuli. The middle and upper classes also
have the resources needed for political participation, such as information, skills
and competence. In addition, they possess the requisite norms, such as feelings
of obligation and civic duty, that motivate them to participate. 54
One instance which demonstrates the political power of these groups is the
change in American opinion concerning the Vietnam War. The majority of
the electorate did not oppose the Vietnam War in 1967, but by 1971 there
was widespread opposition to the war. 55 Public opinion did not turn against
the war because of protests on college campuses. It changed when the draft
46. The savings would vary according to how many people were draftees and how many were volunteers,
but would be at least 500 million dollars. This has been characterized as a conservative estimate.
See 1978 Senate Hearings, supra note 9, at 32 (statement of Elmer B. Staats, Comptroller of the
U.S.).
47. Conrad, The Draft: Is It Coming Back?, Christian Century, April 18, 1979, at 45.
48. Califano, A Presidential Nation 74 (1975).
49. King supra note 2, at 16.
50. Supra note 41.
51. Califano supra note 48, at 75.
52. For a comprehensive survey of the literature in this field see Milbrath, Political Participation 114-128
(1977).
53. Verba and Nie, Participation in America: Political Democracy and Social Equality, 125 (1977).
54. Milbrath supra note 52, at 92.
55. In a Gallup poll conducted in May, 1967, 37 percent of all Americans opposed the Vietnam war. By
May, 1971, this had increased to 61 percent.
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laws were revised in 1971 and middle class boys started coming home in
coffins. 56 President Nixon began the withdrawal of American troops from
Vietnam because he knew he needed the support of the vast American middle
class if he was going to be reelected. He also knew that he would not receive
that support if American men continued to die in Vietnam. A return to a
non-discriminatory draft which would place greater numbers of middle class
and upper class youths in the military would act as a similar constraint on
American presidents in the future.
Another argument against the draft is that soldiers require long training
periods to learn how to operate the increasingly sophisticated modern weaponry
of the armed forces. 57 Those who subscribe to this view believe that conscripts
would not be in the service long enough to learn how to operate these weapons.
While it is true that sophisticated weaponry often requires long training periods,
not all the weaponry used by the services is that complex. There are many
positions in the combat arms, a rifleman in a rifle company being the perfect
example, which do not require long periods of technical training and could
easily be filled by draftees. One must also consider the possibility that some
draftees of higher mental and educational levels than most volunteers would
be able to absorb the technical knowledge needed to operate weaponry much
more quickly than the average volunteer. 58 Thus, they would not need long
periods of training.
An armed services composed of volunteers and a substantial number of
draftees would be preferable to the current AVF for a multiplicity of reasons.
First, it would be a more equitable method of distributing the burden of
national defense, which is every citizen's responsibility. Second, it would save
the taxpayers' money since the armed services would not have to pay high
salaries to obtain personnel. 59 This would also halt the current trend of increased
spending for personnel costs and less spending for weapon procurement and
research and development. 60 Third, it would increase the number of middle
class and upper class individuals in the services. This in turn would provide
the services with people of higher mental and educational levels. Such a change
in personnel composition would help to reduce attrition and discipline problems.
Fourth, the reserve forces would be strengthened, both in terms of numbers
and quality of enlisted personnel, thus making the total force concept a more
viable one.
56. Califano supra note 48, at 75.
57. Drew Middleton, The Voluntary Army in Review, Atlantic, December 1977, at 10.
58. It should be noted that the Army has rewritten its training manuals, downgrading them from an
eleventh grade level to an eighth grade level. See 1978 Senate Hearings: Status, supra note 8, at 92
(statement of Robin Beard, U.S. Representative from Tenn.).
59. Supra note 46.
60. Supra note 24.
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ALTERNATIVES TO THE PRESENT AVF
OTHER THAN CONSCRIPTION
Modification of the AVF
One alternative to conscription is a proposal by Dr. Charles Moskos, who
is concerned about the low mental and educational levels of enlisted personnel
in the AVF.61 He believes that a major priority of the AVF should be to
recruit more intelligent and middle class individuals to the enlisted ranks, and
especially to the combat arms branch. He has proposed that the services offer
a two year enlistment option which would be restricted to combat arms,
low-skill shipboard duty, aircraft security guards and labor intensive jobs. No
promises of learning civilian skills would be made. In return for satisfactorily
completing this enlistment, the enlistee would receive a scholarship to college
from the government.
A strong point of this plan is that it would eliminate the use of the fiction
of acquiring civilian skills to induce people to enlist. This would help to
alleviate post-entry disillusionment and thus reduce the attrition rate and the
number of discipline problems. One problem, however, is that it may not be
able to attract a sufficient number of people to enlist. Many of the individuals
who might be attracted to such a program would be the same ones who would
go to college immediately after high school on an ROTC scholarship. The
ROTC route would attract a sizeable number of people away from Dr. Moskos'
program. The recipient of an ROTC scholarship also receives a free college
education and, although he has to serve four years in the military as opposed
to two, he serves those four years as an officer, rather than as an enlisted
man.
The ease of obtaining grants and loans from the federal government and
state governments for college may also keep many young people from enlisting
in this program. As a solution to this, Dr. Moskos has proposed that the
receipt of these educational benefits should be tied to military service. 62 Such
a step might, however, engender more of an uproar than a return to conscription.
Military service tied to aid for education would not be an equitable solution
to conscription problems, since individuals from higher income brackets who
do not have to use grants or loans would be exempt from this method of
compelling military service.
Other proposals to alleviate some of the AVF's manpower problems have
suggested increasing the number of women in the services and the hiring of
civilians to do work presently done by the services themselves. 63 The problem
with these solutions is that they ignore the fact that the crucial shortages of
personnel are in the combat arms branch. Increasing the number of women
and civilians will not provide more personnel for the combat arms since neither
women nor civilians can serve in the combat arms. Furthermore, such a plan
61. For a more detailed account of Dr. Moskos' proposal see: 1978 House Hearings, supra note 41, at
4.
62. Id. at 7.
63. See Report by Binkin and Johnston, Senate Comm. on Armed Services, 93rd Cong., 1st Sess. 47-49
All-Volunteer Armed Forces: Progress, Problems, and Prospects (Comm. Print 1973).
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will not release men presently in non-combat duties to combat arms. The
logistics of such a move would be prohibitive as would be the cost of reassigning
and retraining personnel. In addition, a change in duty from non-combat to
combat for large numbers of personnel would probably cause attrition and
discipline problems.64
A Return to Registration
The registration of men for the draft without resuming conscription has
also been proposed as a method of upgrading the capabilities of the AVF.
President Ford suspended registration in 1975 and it has not been reinstated
since then. The President, as Commander-in-Chief has the authority under
current law to register every male citizen from eighteen to twenty-six years
of age.65 Recently, Congress voted against a proposal to renew draft registration
for eighteen year olds.66
A good case can be made for a return to registration. United States
strategy, should war break out in Europe, is based on the AVF backed up
by an effective standby draft.67 The United States, however, does not have an
effective standby draft. The Selective Service System is in deep standby and
has been since 1977. It now maintains only 100 fulltime employees plus
approximately 750 Reserve and National Guard officers on a part-time ba-
sis.68 As a result, draftees would not be available to complete training and
enter units until 210 days after a decision was made to return to a draft. If
registration was reinstated, this time would be reduced to 110 days. 69
Because of the recent Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, President Carter
recommended a return to registration in his state of the union speech of 1980.
He did not feel it was necessary to immediately return to a draft. 70 A later
proposal of President Carter recommends that all men and women born in
1960 and 1961 be required to register for the draft. This plan does not include
a physical examination or classification of the registrant. It is not clear,
however, whether his proposal will be passed by Congress because of the great
debate which is expected to ensue over the registration of women.71
According to the Joint Chiefs of Staff, an effective standby draft is an
essential part of U.S. strategy, should a Nato-Warsaw Pact war break out in
Europe. It is their opinion that the lack of an effective standby draft, coupled
with the critical shortage in the Individual Ready Reserve, make for a very
dangerous situation should nuclear deterrence fail.72 Thus, it would appear that
registration is necessary to protect United States security.
64. Moskos supra note 2, at 77.
65. 50 U.S.C. Appx. § 453 (1976).
66. H.R. 4040, 96th Cong., 1st Sess., 125 Cong. Rec. H7783 (1979).
67. The Report of the President's Commission on an All-Volunteer Force supra note 1, at 5-6.
68. 1979 House Hearings, supra note 27, at 18 (report by William D. Price, professional staff member,
House Comm. on Armed Services).
69. Staff of Senate Comm. on Armed Services, 96th Cong., 1st Sess., Report on Reinstitution of Regis-
tration 3-4 (Comm. Print 1979) [hereinafter cited as 1979 Senate Report].
70. Carter, State of the Union 1980, Vital Speeches of the Day, February 1980, at 228.
71. Washington Post, February 9, 1980, at i, col. i.
72. 1979 Senate Report, supra note 69.
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National Service
An interesting and radical alternative to the present AVF or a return to
conscription is a plan of national service for youth.73 The idea of national
service has a lenghthy tradition in the United States. It is based on the
philosophy of interdependence and. hence reciprocal responsibilities. In other
words, each member of society has an obligation to enrich the society in which
he lives and society has an obligation to give each citizen an opportunity to
perform services for society so that he can improve as an individual. 74
Proponents of national service ideas wish to blur the distinction between
military and non-military service to one's country whereby military service
becomes just another type of national service. There are several different
types of national service plans; some plans are compulsory and others are
voluntary. 75 A compulsory scheme of national service would require all youth
to enroll in either military or civilian national service for a fixed time
period. 76 A voluntary, or minimally coercive plan, would require the registration
and evaluation of all youth but would not require any actual service. 77 Such
a program would attempt to encourage young people to volunteer by registering
them and, in so doing, give them information about the various types of
national service. 78
Since the idealistic ethic is a part of the American cultural heritage, there
would probably not be widespread opposition to the implementation of a
national service plan. Such a plan might be good for the general welfare of
the nation if managed correctly. A major question, however, is whether such
a plan would remedy the ills of the AVF. In all probability, a minimally
coercive or volunteer program would not be of much help to the AVF. Anyone
who wishes to serve his country by enlisting in the military can do so already.
Therefore, a voluntary national service plan would probably not create a great
influx of new recruits for the AVF.
73. There have been a number of different proposals and discussions of national service. See King
supra note 2, at 6-7 and 57-58. Also see Janowitz, "The Logic of National Service;" Cullinan,
"National Service and The American Educational System;" Margaret Mead, "A National Service
System as a Solution to a Variety of National Problems:" Eberly, "Guidelines for National Service"
and "Mitrisin, Voluntary National Service" in The Draft (Sol. Tax ed. 1967).
74. Eberly supra note 72.
75. For an in depth discussion of the various types of plans see Cullinan, supra note 72.
76. See Mitrisin supra note 72 who advocates the enactment of a compulsory national service plan.
77. See Janowitz supra note 72 for an example of a voluntary national service plan.
78. King supra note 2, at 57.
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A compulsory system of national service, in all likelihood, would help
alleviate the personnel problems of the AVF. This would especially be true if
those who chose military service were given shorter enlistment terms and higher
salaries than those who chose civilian service. The major drawback to such a
plan, however, is its cost. William King has suggested that a minimally coercive
national service plan would cost as much as 7.9 billion dollars more than the
AVF.79 Another observer, however, places the real cost at about twenty-five
to forty billion dollars. 80 Undoubtedly, a compulsory plan would cost even
more. In addition to the problem of costs, there is no guarantee that the
government will not mismanage what could prove to be a very cumbersome
program because of the large number of people involved. In short, until further
research is done in the area, national service is probably not a realistic
alternative to the AVE.
CONCLUSION
The AVF has some serious problems. It is having difficulty meeting its
recruitment goals, both in terms of numbers and quality, and the prospects
for improvement in the future appear dim. Under the AVF, personnel costs
have risen steadily to the point where they are no longer sustainable. In
addition, attrition and discipline problems have crippled its effectiveness.
The most serious charge which can be leveled against an all-volunteer
force, however, is not that it is inefficient, but rather that it is inequitable.
The AVF is a continuation of the policy of the Vietnam era draft which
conscripted disproportionate numbers of the poor, the uneducated and the
minorities. Today's AVF does rely on economic conscription to fill its enlisted
ranks. More often than not, they are composed of individuals who feel that
they have nowhere else to turn for employment. Those individuals with better
economic opportunities do not join the enlisted ranks of the AVF.
Whether one favors liberty above equality or vice-versa is often indicative
of one's attitude toward conscription. This author places equality above liberty
on his scale of democratic values and hence, favors a return to the draft. But
the draft is more than just an ideal solution to the problems of the AVF; it
is a pragmatic one also. There are no other plans which have been proposed
which will solve the AVF's plight as well as a draft. A minimally coercive
national service plan would fail to provide the necessary personnel for the
armed services and would be much more costly than the present AVE A
compulsory national service plan would provide the required personnel but
would be cost prohibitive. Increasing the number of women and civilians in
the military is not a solution either, since the critical personnel problems in
the armed services occur in the combat arms branch. While -a return to
registration will help to upgrade the readiness of the AVF, it will not provide
the extra manpower needed by the armed services.
79. Id. at 81.
80. Cooper, After Four Years: Concern Over Volunteer Army, Cong. Q. 535, March 26, 1977.
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The ideal system of personnel selection for the armed services is universal
military training, with no deferments except for the physically and mentally
handicapped and the clergy. National defense is every citizen's responsibility
and should be shared equally by all social groups. Universal military training
is the ideal because it is the most equitable system. It is, however, also an
unrealistic proposal since it is cost prohibitive and impractical.
The next best alternative is a lottery draft. While it would conscript some
and not others, it would be more equitable in the sense that each individual
of draft age would have an equal chance of being drafted. It would also be
a more equitable means of distributing the responsibility of national defense
than the AVF. In addition to being more equitable, a lottery draft would also
be more economical and efficient. It would provide a higher caliber of recruit
for the services since it would obtain its personnel from all strata of society.
It would also help to decrease the attrition and discipline problems of the
armed services. The Reserve forces would also be strengthened,, and the total
force concept would be a more viable one. A lottery draft is clearly the
alternative to the AVF which the United States should adopt in the near
future.
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